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RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
DECREES: ARGENTINA, A CASE STUDY

THOMAS J. SKOLA*

INTRODUCTION
The recognition of a foreign judgment by a domestic court and
granting it the same executory force as a domestic decision is commonly
referred to in civil and common law systems alike as an exequatur proceeding. Exequatur proceedings contrast sharply with procedures surrounding the introduction of a foreign judgment into a domestic court
to serve as a public document for purposes of evidence or information in
another judicial proceeding since only in the former do treaty provisions,
the requirements of reciprocity and comity and other varied prerequisites
of domestic law become significant.
Technological innovation and the resulting commercial sophistication
and mobility of merchants has greatly increased the reliance of plaintiffs
on exequatur proceedings as a means of seeking otherwise unobtainable
claims. This resort to exequatur proceedings in the adjudication of claims
between people of different legal systems has been footnoted by many
attempts to secure some type of consensus on the concepts and procedures
practiced in this general area of the law.' A recent application of these
efforts in New York State is the incorporation into that State's law of
the "Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act" (CPLR Art.
53), which codifies existing decisional law respecting the recognition of
foreign country money judgments. Said uniform act has also been adopted
by seven other States of the Union.
Any treatment of a legal device applying the procedural intricacies
of many different legal systems leads to myriad conflicts of law considerations and must for practical reasons be limited in scope and substance. Such limitation of scope and substance should isolate the principal
legal issues of an exequatur proceeding without sacrificing the practical
*Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, New York City; B.A. Univer.
sity of Rochester, 1965; Facuhad de Derecho, Universidad de Chile, 1965-66; Universidad de Madrid, 1966-67; J.D., Columbia University Law School, 1970.
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value of the resulting analysis. The hypothetical problem approach appears to achieve these objectives. Accordingly, I have chosen to confine
myself to an analysis of exequatur as it applies to an attachment order
issued by a New York federal court for recognition and execution in
the Republic of Argentina. An attachment order has been chosen as the
object of the hypothetical exequatur proceeding even though the contrived factual situation somewhat complicates the resulting legal analysis
of the Argentine exequatur provisions in order to emphasize more cogently
some of the underlying policy and conceptual issues related thereto. The
objective throughout, nevertheless, remains a detailed presentation of the
factors which an Argentine court takes into consideration when requested
to recognize and execute a foreign court's pronouncement.
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
A situation has been created in which the Plaintiff plans to initiate
a lawsuit in a New York federal court against an Argentine national who
has bank accounts in the United States and other assets located in Argentina. The Argentine citizen is believed to be in the process of transferring the funds in his United States bank accounts to Argentina and
secreting them along with his other Argentine assets in the event that the
Plaintiff successfully initiates and pursues said lawsuit in the United
States and seeks to enforce the resulting judgment in Argentina through
Argentine judicial channels.
For analytical purposes it has been assumed that the underlying cause
of action is based on default of payment on a properly executed promissory
note and that the Plaintiff is hesitant to initiate a lawsuit directly in the
Argentine courts due to the prohibitory costs of local Argentine counsel,
the lack of familiarity with and confidence in the judicial system of the
Defendant's place of domicile and the relatively small amount of the claim
being litigated. It has also been assumed that the Defendant has no
other assets in the United States except the cited bank accounts and that
he had succeeded in transferring said bank accounts from New York
City to Argentina after the issuance of the preventive attachment order
by the New York federal court, but before said attachment order was
levied by the United States Marshal.
Issue
Given these circumstances, the principal concern of the Plaintiff is
that even if he is ultimately successful in his New York federal court
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action the Defendant's lack of assets in New York State will prevent
execution there of such a judgment and said judgment will remain illusory
unless an exequatw- proceeding on the same is initiated in Argentina. The
resulting delay would give the Defendant sufficient time to secrete his
property in Argentina so as to make remote even the successful execution
of a favorable exequatur proceeding on the judgment in Argentina. Time
being of crucial significance, therefore, the Plaintiff's problem becomes
one of determining the quickest way of enforcing his issued but unlevied
attachment order as a provisional remedy in Argentina.
The direct initiation of a preventive attachment proceeding in Argentina remains an alternative. The Plaintiff's factual situation appears
to qualify under the requirements set forth in Art. 209(2) or (3)2 and
perhaps 212(3)1 of the Argentine Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (CCP), although the latter depends upon whether the order of
attachment in the United States is considered a judgment (sentencia)
for purposes of Argentine law thereunder (see subsequent discussion.)
There is also some doubt whether such a preventive attachment action
could be brought in Argentina as a provisional remedy without also
initiating there the primary suit. The first paragraph of Art. 1964 of
the CCP states that Argentine judges should refuse to rule on such
provisional remedies when the underlying action does not lie within their
jurisdiction. The choice of verb, deberdn (abstenerse) in particular, suggests a stringent interpretation, although the last two inserts do treat the
exception.
Another alternative is to petition the New York federal court which
issued the attachment order to send letters rogatory to an Argentine judge
in Buenos Aires requesting that he, pursuant to Art. 1311 or 5176 of the
CCP, levy said previously issued order of attachment. Although it is not
common practice to resort to this device to levy orders of attachment, experience under the Montevideo Treaty and the possibility of an expansive
interpretation of "request" in Title 28 USC 17817 as a result of new
legislation proposed in the area of international cooperation appear to
warrant such an effort.
Under New York State law [Art. 64 of The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) provides that federal courts will follow the law of the
State in which they sit in attachment proceedings] an attachment lien
comes into existence when the order of attachment is delivered to the
sheriff by the court.8 Thus the Plaintiff had a lien on the Defendant's
bank accounts before the Defendant removed them from New York City
and would appear to qualify for letters rogatory treatment under Title 28
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USC 1781. Furthermore, Art. 26(b) of the FRCP and Art. 6220 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) could be utilized by the Plaintiff
to petition the court to compel the Defendant's New York City banks "at
any time after the granting of an order of attachment and prior to the
judgment" to disclose all information necessary to the enforcement of
such an order of attachment.
Assuming that the New York federal court decides that such letters
rogatory are warranted under Title 28 USC 1781, and the disclosure provisions succeed in gathering sufficient detail as to the nature and location
of the Defendant's assets in Buenos Aires, the crucial issue thus becomes:
Should Argentine judges execute requests for the extra-territorial levy of
attachments on assets located within their territory when such requests are
made by judges of a foreign jurisdiction? This issue, in turn, encompasses
the question of whether the jurisdiction and competence of the foreign
court should be reviewed on the merits by the Argentine court in the
exequatur proceedings, and if so, whether the jurisdiction and competence
of the requesting court should be determined by standards set by Argentine law.
Analysis
The Great Debate
Much controversy has ranged over the scope of exequatur proceedings in the "international order" and to what degree Argentine judges
will permit the forced execution of foreign resolutions that are not satisfied
voluntarily by the Defendant without reviewing the merits of the foreign
cause of action (revision au fond.) Lazeano, Podetti and Moreno adhere
to the more traditional view which gives the exequatur proceeding more
range and relies upon a strict construction of Art. 1 of the CCP 9 and Art.
10 and 11 of the Argentine Civil Code (CC) 0-thereby merging choice
of law and jurisdiction concepts--to review the jurisdiction and competence of the foreign judge on the merits. Couture and three fairly recent
Argentine cases dealing with Uruguayan11 and Paraguayan12 letters rogatory and a Brazilian attachment" regard exequatur proceedings less
stringently and emphasize the "international order" and ideas of comity
and international cooperation. The principal points of argument and their
rebuttals can be summarized as follows:
I. The failure to review on the merits prevents Argentina from exercising "its eminent right of safeguard over the property of the individual
which has its juridical location within the territory."' 4 In arguing that
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the sovereignty of the nation is inalienable and constitutes the very source
of jurisdiction, Lazcano stresses Art. I of the CCP-the jurisdiction of
Argentine courts cannot be extended except in matters exclusively patrimonial, but even in these cases it cannot be extended to foreign judges
who act outside the Republic-and Art. 10 and 11 of the CC-Argentine
law governs over property located in Argentina.
Couture answers such an argument by stressing the juridical nature
of attachment: (i) it does not purport to enforce the rights of ownership
to such assets, but is merely a limitation on the rights of the owner to
dispose of his property; (ii) it guarantees the efficiency and superiority
of the judicial function by keeping judicial acts from becoming illusory.' s
II. The failure to review on the merits contravenes the public order,
public policy and security of the Nation.
Rebuttal of this point includes the following arguments: (i) the power
of eminent domain is not diminished; (ii) it is a mere temporary, pro.
visional remedy; (iii) attachment simply prevents the debtor from changing the location of his assets; (iv) there remains the safeguard afforded
by allowing domestic creditors priority over foreign creditors.
II. The failure to review on the merits disrupts the general principle
that the power of foreign judges cannot be extended over objects outside
their forum.
The opposing view contends that: (i) the judge who orders the writ
of attachment neither judges nor prejudices the primary action; (ii) the
sale of the attached object remains valid; (iii) the assets were within the
jurisdiction of the forum when the order was issued.
Recent cases involving Argentina and countries signatory to the
Montevideo Treaty tend to ignore reviewability on the merits. A summary
of Argentina's experience in this area under the treaty may serve as
common ground upon which to base some substantive conclusions of law.
Experience under the Treaty of Montevideo
The Treaty of Montevideo contains two provisions which give letters
rogatory and judgments of the signatory countries--Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Argentina-an advantage over those of non-member
countries. Art. 5 declares that all judgments of all member countries should
have the same effect as in the country where issued and Art. 11-13 outline
the necessary procedures and stress the goal of international cooperation
with respect to the issuing and processing of letters rogatory. Couture points
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out that the various purposes for which letters rogatory may be used thereunder are not exhaustive and thus concludes that there was an assumption
that common practices pre-existed the treaty and were necessarily incorporated into it.16 These provisions have been interpreted by Argentine
courts to mean no review on the merits, only on the formal procedures followed, except in the areas where international jurisdiction has been specific.
ally reserved to the Argentine courts.
A compelling reason for extending similar exequatur guidelines to
nonsignatory countries is the reference by Rocca and Griffi, in their commentary 17 on the amended articles of the CCP treating exequatur (Art.
517-519) to the rationale offered by Judge Teran in the Banco de Credito
case as the prevailing authority in this general area. Said rationale
expressly rejected review on the merits of Uruguayan letters rogatory.
Furthermore, Art. 517-519 of the CCP are no longer dependent upon the
principle of reciprocity for their effectiveness, Art. 517 making specific
provision for countries with which treaties have not been signed.
One must take into account, however, the traditional tendency of
Argentine courts to restrict application of the Montevideo Treaty to matters
falling strictly within it. Likewise, Argentine judges themselves are accustomed to taking the procedural steps necessary therein and tend to think
of the problem of international procedure as one of cooperation among
judicial officials. In the United States, on the other hand, the parties
themselves, through their attorneys, are accustomed to taking the appropriate procedural steps and the problems of international procedure is
presented more in terms of territorial limitations on judicial jurisdiction
and international cooperation. These basic conceptual differences may
impede attempts to stretch Argentine judicial administration under the
treaty into a universal practice.I s
No Review on the Merits
Augusto de Lisi v. Vincente Silenzi [Civil Chamber (22) of the
Capital, 46 Jur. Arg. 365; 9/12/34] supports the view that Argentine
courts will not review a foreign judgment on the merits. In this particular
case, an Argentine court refused to review a New York judgment on the
merits, even though the underlying cause of action was based on a contract
executed in violation of Art. 1193 of the Argentine Civil Code (CC). 19
Therefore, for purposes of this particular subdivision, we shall assume that
both the issuance of letters rogatory and the issuance of the order of
attachment by the New York federal judge will not be reviewed on the
merits by the Argentine court. There still remains, however, the question
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of whether such a request meets the requirements of the exequatur provisions, as set forth in Art. 517 of the CCP.
There is much doubt, at a preliminary level, whether the order of
attachment would be considered a judgment for purposes of Art. 517 of
the CCP and thus even subject to the requisites set forth thereunder. If
such an order of attachment is not deemed to be a judgment under Argentine law, then the letters rogatory would appear to be governed solely by
Art. 131 of the CCP 20 and the corresponding undefined ideas of international assistance which surround it. Goldschnidt generalizes about letters
rogatory and states that they are usually honored in Argentina if: (i) they
are duly authenticated (according to the procedures of the forum); (ii)
the Court issuing them is a court of competent jurisdiction; and (iii)
enforcement does not violate Argentine public order. 21 The Banco de
Cridito case supports this approach by drawing a distinction between a
judgment and a precautionary measure which does not affect any rights
and which can be challenged by the debtor in the lawsuit that motivated it.
Nevertheless, for analytical purposes hereunder and in an effort to
achieve the hereinabove stated objective of delineating the Argentine legal
provisions governing exequatur, it is assumed that the New York federal
court's attachment order will be considered a judgment for purposes of
Art. 517 of the CCP and thus subject to the stipulations contained therein
before it may be executed in Argentina.
The first point of analysis under Art. 517 of the CCP is its requirement that the judgment be the result of an in personam action or of an
in rem action if it concerns personal property which has been transferred
to Argentina during or after the lawsuit initiated abroad. Since we have
already stipulated that the Defendant transferred his bank accounts to
Argentina after the issuance of the attachment order, but before said order
was levied by the United States Marshal, there remains little doubt that
the personal property in the instant situation (bank accounts) left New
York City after, or at least during the attachment action initiated in New
York City. There is a remote possibility, however, that the last sentence of
Art. 517(1) may be construed to require that the bank accounts be transferred during or aJter the primary lawsuit, that is to say, the default payment lawsuit, is initiated in the New York federal court in order for the
attachment order issued thereunder to qualify for exequatur treatment in
Argentina. Nevertheless, I conclude that the phrase juicio tramitado en el
extranjero refers to the attachment action itself and that this particular
condition of Art. 517(1) is properly met in the instant situation.
In addition thereto, Art. 517(1) also stipulates that the judgment be
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res judicata (con autoridad de cosa juzgada en el estado en que se ha
pronunciado) in the foreign jurisdiction. An order of attachment is normally considered a "provisional remedy," offering only temporary relief
thereunder and subject to modification by the issuing court, and thus the
instant order does not appear to be res judicata for purposes hereof. Nevertheless, assuming that the time during which the Defendant may move to
vacate or modify said order of attachment has elapsed and the Plaintiff
has already initiated the primary lawsuit in the New York federal court,
the Plaintiff may have some basis upon which to convince the Argentine
court that the attachment order has become cosa juzgada in New York
State since the attachment action itself has terminated and the order resulting thereof can only be annulled "by operation of law if the primary action
abates or is discontinued, or if final judgment is rendered for the Defendant or judgment for the Plaintiff is fully satisfied. ' 22 In all events, this
point remains a definite obstacle to any recognition and enforcements of
the attachment order in Argentina pursuant to Art. 517 of the CCP.
The necessity of personally serving (personalmente citada) the Defendant under Art. 512(2) of the CCP does not appear to be a source of concern in the instant situation, since the inclusion in the first paragraph of
Art. 517 of an in remn action on personal property removed from the foreign
jurisdiction appears to support the position that the Plaintiff does not have
to personally notify the Defendant of such an event before the subsequent
order was issued in order to qualify thereunder. It appears sufficient for
purposes thereof that the Plaintiff personally notifies the Defendant of the
attachment action at any time before said order is levied by the appropriate
Argentine judicial officials. This construction is based, in part, on the fact
that service or notice in civil law countries is normally a procedural step
and not a primary base of jurisdiction. Therefore, it appears that the
Plaintiff's jurisdictional base is furnished by Art. 517(1) of the CCP and
that the Plaintiff must merely comply with the notification provisions of
Art. 339-345 of the CCP23 in order to meet the notice condition of Art.
517(2) of the CCP.
The requirement in Art. 517(3) of the CCP that the obligation upon
which the foreign lawsuit is based be valid under Argentine law referred,
in its previous context, exclusively to foreign legal obligations which were
against Argentine public policy (Art. 14 of the CC) and did not necessarily
require a review of the underlying obligation on the merits. 24 If this
construction still obtains, however, the inclusion of a specific public policy
provision in Art. 517(4) of the amended CCP would appear to be redundant and unnecessary in this context. No new cases have been uncovered
which suggest that Argentine courts will construe Art. 517(3) and (4)
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together, as amended, any differently than they construed the previous
public policy provisions. Nevertheless, neither the obligation underlying
the attachment and summary actions nor the order of attachment issued
thereunder appear to be against the public policy of Argentina in this
particular instance.
Art. 517(5) of the CCP provides that the judgment be valid in the
foreign forum. There is little doubt in the instant case that the cited order
of attachment is valid in the New York federal court since it was filed
timely by the Plaintiff and not opposed by the Defendant. Likewise, it is
assumed that there is no prior or simultaneous legal action pending in
Argentine courts by third parties claiming an interest in the Defendant's
assets [Art. 517(6) of the CCP].
Review on the Merits
In the event that the Argentine judge also decides to review the
request to levy the order of attachment on the merits, he must first determine whether the New York federal judge was competent to order such a
writ of attachment under standards of Argentine law. Argentine legal
provisions concerning jurisdiction and competence thus become significant.
Art. 6 of the CCP clearly states that the judge of the primary lawsuit shall
be competent in matters involving the enforcement and effect of judgments
and the issuance of preliminary or provisional remedies.2 5 Similarly, Art.
5(2) of the CCP provides that in in rem actions the judge of the Defendant's domicile or the judge where said property is located shall have juris26
diction thereof.
Jurisdiction and competence in the underlying cause of action based
on default of payment on a properly executed promissory note appear to
be governed by Art. 5(3) of the CCP27 and Art. 1216 of the CC.28 Art.
5(3) of the CCP provides that jurisdiction shall lie with the judge of the
place of performance of the obligation and, failing this, at the option of
the Plaintiff, with the judge in either the Defendant's domicile or where
the contract was executed, provided that the Defendant is present at the
time of service. Art. 1216 of the Civil Code permits the Plaintiff to initiate
an action in the Defendant's domicile or in the place of contractural performance, even though the Defendant may not be present. Commentary by
Roca and Griffi on Art. 1 of the CCP29 is as follows: "In international
type negotiations--import-export--it is frequent that the Argentine courts
will defer consideration of the contracts to other courts." 30
There does not appear, therefore, to be much basis upon which an
Argentine court can decide that the New York federal judge was incom-
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petent to issue the order of attachment or letters rogatory. Not only was
said judge a member of the same court which may entertain jurisdiction
in the primary lawsuit, but the property, object of the preventive attachment order was within the jurisdiction of the New York federal court
when it issued said order of attachment. Likewise, it has been assumed that
the cited promissory note was to be paid by the Defendant in New York
City.
Choice.of-law considerations should likewise not prove to be an obstacle
in the instant situation since Art. 1205 of the CC states that all contracts
entered into abroad shall be governed by the law of the place of execution.3 1
Even if the Argentine court should decide for one reason or another to
apply Argentine substantive law to a review on the merits, the Defendant's
promissory note should be sufficient under Art. 616-624 of the CC,32 Title
3
33
X of the Commercial Code and Art. 209(2) (3) and 212(3) of the CCP 4
to overcome any attempt thereunder to deny enforcement of the order of
attachment.
CONCLUSION
Since the expense of Argentine counsel and unfamiliarity with the
Argentine legal system rule against initiating the primary action directly
in Argentina, and due to the uncertainty of successfully maintaining a
preventive attachment action in Argentina while at the same time continuing the primary lawsuit in a New York federal court, the best alternative
available in the instant situation appears to be to petition the New York
federal court to issue letters rogatory to a judge in Argentina whereby
said judge is requested to levy the order of attachment handed down by
this same New York federal court. The Argentine judge should be requested
to levy said attachment order pursuant to Art. 131 of the CCP, rather than
in accordance with Art. 517 of the CCP, since considerable doubt has been
raised with respect to the scope of the definitions of judgment and res
judicata, as used therein, and it is highly probable that said order of
attachment would neither be subject to nor qualify under the stipulations
contained therein. On the other hand, the undefined scope of Art. 131,
together with the recent trend by Argentine courts under the Montevideo
Treaty to seek international assistance within an atmosphere of international cooperation, provide stronger basis for an Argentine court to
recognize and enforce such an order thereunder. Even if the attachment
action and the primary lawsuit are reviewed on the merits, it is unlikely
that either will be rejected on jurisdictional or competency grounds. In
summary, letters rogatory are an unusual device to use under these particular circumstances, and may be more dilatory than initiating a preventive
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attachment action directly in Argentina, and less certain than initiating
the primary action in Argentina, but appear the more legally prudent and
economically practical of the alternatives presented above.
NOTES
1.
2.

3.

See, among others, Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Acts, and the Treaty of Montevideo.
Art. 209. Procedencia.- Podri pedir embargo preventivo el acreedor de deuda
en dinero o en especie que se ballare en alguna de ias condiciones
siguientes:

Art. 212.

2)

Que ]a existencia del cr6dito est6 demostrada con instrumento
p6blico o privado atribuido al deudor, abonada la firma por
informaci6n sumaria de dos testigos.

3)

Que fundindose la acci6n en un contrato bilateral, se justifique
sa existencia en la misma forma del inciso anterior, debiendo
en este caso probarse ademis sumariamente cl cumplimiento del
contrato por parte del actor, salvo que 6ste ofreciese cumplirlo,
o que su obligaci6n fuese a plazo.

Proceso pendiente.preventivo:

Durante el proceso podrt decretarse el embargo

Si quien lo solicita hubiese obtenido sentencia favorable aunque
estuviere recurrida.
Los jueces deberin
4. Art. 196. Medida decretada por juez incompetente.abstenerse de decretar medidas precautorias cuando el conocimiento
de la causa no fuese de su competencla.
Sin embargo, la medida ordenada por un juez incompetente
seri vilida siempre que haya sido dispuesta de conformidad con las
prescripciones de este capitulo, pero no prorrogarA su competencia.
El juez que decret6 la medida, inmediatamente despu~s de
requerido remitiri las actuaciones al que sea competente.
3)

5.

Art. 131.

Oficios y exhortos dirigidos a jueces de la Repfiblica.- Toda comunicaci6n dirigida a jueces nacionales por otros del mismo caricter,
se harA mediante oficio. Las dirigidas a jueces provinciales por
exhorto.
Podrin entregarse al interesado, bajo recibo en el expediente, o
remitirse por correo. En los casos urgentes, podrin expedirse o anticiparse telegrificamente.
Se dejari copia fiel en el expediente de todo exhorto u oficio
que se libre.

6. Art. 517. Procedencia.- Las sentencias de los tribunales extranjeros tendrin
fuerza ejecutoria en los t6rminos de los tratados celebrados con el
pais de que provengan.
Cuando no hubiese tratados, serin ejecutables si concurrieren
los siguientes requisitos:
1" Que Is sentencia, con autoridad de cosa juzgada en el
estado en que se ha pronunciado, emane de tribunal competente
en el orden internacional y sea consecuencia del ejercicio de una
acei6n personal, o de una acei6n real sobre un bien mueble, si 6ste
ha sido trasladado a la Repdblica durante o desputs del juicio tramitado en el extranjero.
20 Que ]a parte condenada, domiciliada en la Rep6blica, hubiese
sido personalmente citada.
30 Que la obligaei6n que baya constituido el objeto del juicio
sea vilida segtn nuestras leyes.
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40 Que Iasentencia no contenga disposiciones contrarias al
orden piblico interno.
50 Que la sentencia retina los requisitos necesarios para ser
considerada como tal en el lugar en que hubiere sido dictada, y las
condiciones de autenticidad exigidas por la ley nacional.
6* Que ]a sentencia no sea incompatible con otra pronunciada,
con anterioridad o simultineamente, por un tribunal argentino.
7. 28 USC 178, as interpreted in The Signe (37 F. Supp. 819, D.C. La., 1941),
defines letters rogatory as:
One country, speaking through its courts, requests another country acting through its courts and by methods of court procedure
peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist
the administration of justice in the former country, and such
requests are usually granted by reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times. CPLR #3108 also defines
letters rogatory as:
A method of obtaining testimony by appeal to a tribunal in a foreign country to examine the witness and report back the information obtained.
An important distinguishing consideration between the two definitions is that
the federal concept of letters rogatory encompasses any general "request" while
the CPLR appears to confine said device to a specific type of request, to wit:
"a method of obtaining testimony."
8. CPLR Section 6203.
9. Art.

1. Caricter.- La competencia atribuida a los tribunales nacionales
improrrogable. Sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto por el articulo
inciso 4, de la ley 48, excepttiase la competencia territorial en
asuntos exclusivamente patrimoniales, que podrd ser prorrogada
conformidad de partes, pero no a favor de jueces extranjeros o
irbitros que acttien fuera de la Reptiblica.

es
12,
los
de
de

10. Which basically state that Argentine law governs over property located in
Argentina.
11.

Banco de Cridito v. La Tixtila S.A., CN Comm., Sala A, 86 La Ley 32 (1956).

12.

(Autos 'J.A. y O.J.D. sobre Ejec. sent."; fallo del 24 de abril de 1968).

13. Rappaport v. Sociedad Sao Miguel Filmes do Brasil Lta. CN Comm., Sala A,
106 La Ley 78 (1961).
14. Lazeano, "La excepci6n de sin competencia
de sept. 8, 1953. No. 5427.

en exhortos extranjeros", J.S.

15. Couture, "Observaciones en el Informe sobre Uniformidad de Legislaci6n
Relativa a la Cooperaci6n Internacional en Asistencia Judicial", Pan American
Union Document CIJ-26 (1953).
16. Ibid.
17.

Rocca, I. and Griffi, Omar, Teoria y Prdctica del C6digo Procesal Civil y
Comercial de la Naci6n (1969).

18.

Report on the Uniformity of Legislation in International Cooperation in
Judicial Procedures, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Pan American Union
(1963).

19.

Requiring that all contracts exceeding a certain value be in writing.

20. Op. Cit., Note 5.
21.

Goldschmidt and Novas, Bilateral Studies of American-Argentine Private International Law, Parker School of Corporative Law (1966).
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22.

CPLR #6224

23.

Art. 339.

Demandado domiciliado o residente en la jurisdicei6n del juzgado.La citaci6n se hari par medio de cidula que se entregari al
demandado en su domicilio real, si aqu~l fuere habido, juntamente
con las copias a que se refiere el articulo 120.
Si no se lo encontrare, se le dejari aviso para que espere al
dia siguiente y si tampoco entonces se le hallare, se procederi
segsin se prescribe en el articulo 141.
Si el domicilio asignado al demandado por el actor fuere falsa,
probado el hecho, se anularA todo lo actuado a costa del demandante.

Art. 340.

Demandado domiciliado o residente fuera de ]a jurisdieci6n.Cuando la persona que ha de ser citada no se encontrare en el
lugar donde se le demanda, Ia citaci6n se hari por media de oficio
o exhorto a la autoridad judicial de la localidad en que se halle
sin perjuicio, en su caso, de lo dispuesto en la ley de trimite uniforme sabre exhortos.

Art. 341.

Provincia demandada.- En las causas en que una provincia fuere
parte, la citaci6n se har; por oficios dirigidos al gobernador y al
fiscal de estado o funcionario que tuviere sus atribucioanes.

Art. 342.

Ampliaci6n y fijaci6n de plazo.- En los casos del articulo 340, el
plazo de quince dias quedardi ampliado en la forma prescripta en
el artieulo 159.
Si el demandado residiese fuera de la Repdblica, el juez fijara
el plaza en que haya de comparecer, atendiendo a las distancias y
a la mayor o menor facilidad de las comunicaciones.

Art. 343.

Demandado incierto o con domicilio o residencia ignorados.- La
citaci6n a personas inciertas o cuyo domicilio o residencia se ignorare se hari par edictos publicados por dos dias en la forna prescripta par los articulos 145, 146 y 147.
Si vencido el plaza de los edictos no compareciere el citado, se
nombrard al defensor oficial para que lo represente en el juicio.
El defensor deberi tratar de hacer Ilegar a conocimiento del interesado la existencia del juicio y, en su easo, recurrir de la sentencia.

Art. 344.

Demandados con domicilios o residencias en diferentes jurisdicciones.- Si los demandados fuesen varios y se hallaren en diferentes jurisdicciones, el plaza de la citaci6n s6lo se considerara
vencido a los efectos legales con respecto a todos. cuando venza
para el que se encontrare a mayor distancia.

Art. 345.

Citacidn defectuosa.- Si In citacidn se hiciere en contravenci6n
a Io prescripto en los articulos que preceden, sori nula y se aplicard io dispuesto en el articulo 149.

24. Op. Cit., Note 21.
25. Art.

6.

Reglas Especiales. A falta de otras disposiciones sordi juez competente:
1. En los incidentes, tercerias, citaci6n de evicei6n, cumplimiento de transacci6n celebrada en juicio, ejecuci6n de sentencia,
regulaci6n y ejecuci6n de honorarios y costas devengadas en juicio,
obligaciones de garantia y acciones accesorias en general, el del
proceso principal.
4. En las medidas preliminares y precautorias, el que deba
conocer en el proceso principal.

26. Art.

5.

Reglas Generales. Con excepci6n de los casos de pr6rroga expresa a
ticita, cuando procediere, y sin perjuicio de las reglas contenidas
en este C6digo o en otras leyes, serd juez competente:

FOREIGN JUDICIAL DECREES IN ARGENTINA

27. Art.

5.

2. Cuando se ejerciten acciones reales sobre bienes muebles,
el del lugar en que se encuentren o el del domicilio del demandado,
a elecci6n del actor. Si la acci6n versare sobre bienes muebles e
inmuebles conjuntamente, el del lugar donde estuvieran situados
estos 6ltimos.
Reglas Generales. Con excepci6n de los casos de pr6rroga expresa o
tdcita, cuando procediere, y sin perjuicio de las reglas contenidas
en este C6digo o en otras leyes, seri juez competente:
3. Cuando se ejereiten acciones personales, el del lugar en que
deba cumplirse la obligaci6n y, en su defecto, a elecci6n del actor,
el del domicilio del demandado o el del lugar del contrato, siempre
que el demandado se encuentre en 61, aunque sea accidentalmente,
en el momento de la notificaci6n.
El que no tuviere domicilio fijo podr~i ser demandado en el
lugar en que se encuentre o en el de su 6iltima residencia.

28.

Art. 1216. Si el deudor tuviere su domicilio o residencia en la Rep6blica, y el
contrato debiese cumplirse fuera de ella, el acreedor podri demandarlo ante los jueces de su domicilio, o ante los del lugar del cumplimiento del contrato. aunque el deudor no se hallase alli.

29.

Op. Cit., Note 9.

30.

Op. Cit., Note 17.

31.

Art. 1205. Los contratos hechos fuera del territorio de ]a Repfiblica serin
juzgados, en cuanto a su validez o nulidad, su naturaleza y obligaciones que produzcan, por las leyes del lugar en que hubiesen sido
celebrados.

32.

Treating obligations to pay a sum of money.

33.

Treating letters of credit and promissory notes.

34.

Op. Cit., Notes 2 and 3.

